Edward Said's Orientalism has been almost universally acclaimed by Western intellectuals as a brilliant critique of discourse on the "Orient." However, there appears to be a lack of appreciation, by those who acclaim this work and the work of the subaltern historians influenced by Said, of all its implications. Said is not merely revealing the underlying power relations and distortions associated with discourse on major regions of the world; he is attacking the whole notion of understanding the cultures of these regions. And less explicitly, he and the subaltern historians are not merely questioning the adequacy of the narratives that attempted to put the history of the world in perspective; they are attacking the quest for such "grand narratives. 
Quoting and elaborating on this, Said argues that the essence of the "Oriental" does not have a great deal to do with the people living in regions designated as the Orient, but is more the repository of the characteristics in opposition to which people in the West define themselves. The Orient is the "Other" in relation to which people in the West establish their own identity, usually to affirm the values they exalt and occasionally to lament those values they suppress.
Said does not provide us with any alternative forms of knowledge of the Orient. He argues:
The methodological failures of Orientalism cannot be accounted for by saying that the real Orient is different from Oriental portraits of it.... It is not the thesis of this book to suggest that there is such a thing as a real or true Orient (Islam, Arab, or whatever).... On the contrary, I have been arguing that "the Orient" is itself a constituted entity, and that the notion that there are geoPhilosophy East & West graphical spaces with indigenous, radically "different" inhabitants who can be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or racial essence proper to that geographical space is equally a highly debatable idea.8
He does allow, though, that "interesting work is most likely to be produced by scholars whose allegiance is to a discipline defined intellectually and not to a 'field' like Orientalism defined either canonically, imperially, or geographically."9 This implies that scholars should abandon the effort to understand any but isolated aspects of those regions designated as the Orient, and that all our knowledge of these regions should be filtered through established academic disciplines. Or more radically, that all efforts to construct narratives about the "Other" be abandoned. This essentially is the conclusion drawn by subaltern historians influenced by In his famous essay "Science and Society in East and West," Needham referred to efforts to account for the social origins of science and efforts to describe civilizations, and defined his own project as a refinement of such work. He writes in conclusion to this:
The study of other civilisations ... places traditional historical thought in a serious intellectual difficulty. For the most obvious and necessary kind of explanation which it demands is one which would demonstrate the fundamental differences in social and economic structure and mutability between Europe on the one hand and the great Asian civilisations on the other, differences which would account not only for the development of modern science in Europe alone, but also of capitalism in Europe alone, together with its typical accompaniments of protestantism, nationalism, etc. not paralleled in any other part of the globe. Such explanations are, I believe, capable of much refinement. They must in no way neglect the importance of a multitude of factors in the realm of ideas-language and logic, religion and philosophy, theology, music, humanitarianism, attitudes to time and change-but they will be most deeply concerned with the analysis of society in question, its patterns, its urges, its needs, its transformations.... In sum, I believe that the analysable differences in social and economic pattern between China and Arran E. Care
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Western Europe will in the end illuminate, as far as anything can ever throw light on it, both the earlier predominance of Chinese science and technology and also the later rise of modern science in Europe alone .11 This reflects what Needham has tried to do in Science and Civilisation in China. The first volume begins with a characterization of Chinese language and writing, and then goes on to treat the background geography and history and the conditions of travel of scientific ideas and techniques between China and Europe. The second volume, the most controversial, is a study of the various systems of thought or world outlooks that have emerged in China and that have contributed to or impeded the growth of a scientific tradition in China. In this work, Chinese and European systems of thought are contrasted, and their genesis explained in terms of the social and economic organization and the class conflicts in each civilization. Specific accounts of developments in science and technology are situated in relation to general world outlooks, which themselves are explained in terms of forms of cognition developing in socioeconomic practices.
Such explanations are essentially in accordance with the theory of "sociomorphisms" of the Russian Marxist philosopher Aleksandr Bogdanov.12 According to Bogdanov, all advances in knowledge are based on substitution-taking an object and effectively changing it into something else, while at the same time admitting the essential difference. For instance, to say that the sun is a star, a conglomeration of gases in space that behaves according to the laws of motion, is to substitute something else for the sun as people visually apprehended it. Advances in understanding are made by substituting for a simpler, less plastic complex with which relatively little may be done in practice or consciousness, a complex that is more subtle, more plastic, and therefore more useful. In this way experience is organized into a unified whole. The cognitive models that are used as substitutes originate in simple social-labor practices, in the methods of social-labor technique, or in economic relations. Cognitive forms taken from practical life then reinforce the way this life is organized. For example, atomism "originated in ancient thought when individualism developed in society, setting men apart. People were accustomed to think about themselves and others as isolated entities, and 
Archaeology and Genealogy versus Hermeneutics
Foucault counterposed his archaeology, and later his genealogy,16 to hermeneutics as part of a general attack on all approaches to the history of ideas that are "related to the synthetic activity of the subject" and that aim to provide a shelter for the sovereign subject.17 As Foucault formulated the opposition, hermeneutics seeks to rediscover the meaning expressed in an enunciation while archaeology tries to discover "the rules of formation that govern it."18 In defense of this new approach, he subjected to searching criticism the "subjective unities" that are the objects of standard hermeneutic approaches to history, from the book or work of a given writer to the oeuvre, the assemblage of all the writers' Arran E. Gare Philosophy East & 'l-st works, to the periods and traditions, the works of authors related by interests and influences, to disciplines, which include different traditions through different periods, to the spirit of an age formed by the generalized influence of all on all.19 Archaeology is presented as an alternative to the search for geneses, filiations, kinships, and influences between ideas, and to "total history," which seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilization, its spirit, its Weltanschauung, its fundamental categories, and the organization of its sociocultural world. 20 There are two prongs to this attack on hermeneutics: one, more general, deriving from Foucault's alliance with the structuralists and with Nietzsche's rejection of the explanatory role of consciousness, and a more specific attack against unilinear conceptions of history deriving from Foucault's alliance with the history of science of Gaston Bachelard and George Canguilhem and with the Annales school of historians. Foucault's efforts, following the work of Claude Levi-Strauss, to find the rules controlling discourse beyond the level of the sentence in the same way that structuralists had discovered the rules of differentiation and combination of phonemes, morphemes, and lexemes, thereby to explain the production of statements independent of conscious intention, was a failure, as Manfred Frank has shown.21 And while the later recourse to Nietzsche's arguments, invoking power to account for the order of discourse, does provide a basis for criticizing the overemphasis on the role of consciousness in history characteristic of existentialist social philosophy, it does not provide a basis for totally rejecting consciousness.
Foucault's arguments against the centrality of consciousness and the sovereignty of the subject are complemented by his arguments against unilinear history, that is, by his defense of discontinuities and of multiple histories. However, these arguments do not really invalidate hermeneutics. In fact, Foucault's insights frequently enrich the tradition of hermeneutic thought. His characterization of epistemes in The Order of Things provides a more rigorous formulation of the notion of Weltanschauung and of the fundamental categories characterizing the spirit of an age, while his concept of discursive formations developed in The Archaeology of Knowledge provides a more rigorous formulation of the concept of tradition.22 Even the critical analysis of the "subjective unities," such as the book, the author, and the oeuvre, can be taken as refinements of these concepts, revealing how they are socially constituted, rather than as a total rejection of them. This analysis is only problematic when it is taken to deny any autonomy whatsoever to these "unities." It is possible for theorists of hermeneutics to accept Foucault's arguments and still allow a partial autonomy to such unities, as for instance Pierre Bourdieu allowed authors and artists within their cultural fields. 23 Recent developments of hermeneutics by Hans Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, and Alasdair Maclntyre are either free of the features of hermeneutic thought shown to be problematic by Foucault, or answer Foucault's objections. Gadamer has rejected the sovereign subject and conceived of language as an order transcending the individual consciousness. 24 In doing these things, these hermeneutic theorists have avoided the pitfalls of archaeology and genealogy. The fundamental problem with Foucault's approach to history, and correspondingly with Said's attack on Orientalism, is that the starting point is without foundation, and this approach precludes even the possibility of understanding other cultures. Foucault had followed Bachelard and Canguilhem to argue that major advances in science 'nvolve the construction of new theoretical objects and, associated with this, new concepts. This insight informs both Foucault's concept of "episteme" and his concept of "discursive formation." But if all statements are generated by some framing episteme or discursive formation, then how is it possible to defend any particular episteme or discursive formation, or make statements that bring to consciousness the history of previous epistemes or discursive formations? Statements are relative to particular discursive formations. Said, taking over Foucault's archaeology and genealogy, is in the awkward position of condemning not only most, but all, Orientalists because he has virtually presupposed that there is no such thing as the understanding of other cultures, that statements or representations can be nothing but exercises of power as parts of discursive formations. And at the same time he has undermined any basis to justify his own critique.
Gadamer and Maclntyre have addressed these problems. Gadamer has addressed the issue of the relation between the tradition within which one is situated and the texts produced in cultures sharing radically different presuppositions, showing the necessity of approaching these texts from the prejudices of one's own tradition. This enriches this tradition by revealing its prejudices and by facilitating the appropriation to it of what had been lost in past traditions. Maclntyre, developing his ideas through an analysis of the history of science, provides support for Gadamer's arguments, but in such a way that there is more room for creative thinking and for a more critical attitude to the tradition or tradi-Arran E. Gare When two rival large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central feature of the problem of deciding between their claims is characteristically that there is no neutral way of characterizing either the subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be evaluated. Each stand-point has its own account of truth and knowledge, its own mode of characterizing the relevant subject matter. And the attempt to discover a neutral, independent set of standards or mode of characterizing data which is both such as must be acceptable to all rational persons and is sufficient to determine the truth of the matters about which the two traditions are at variance has generally, and perhaps universally, proved to be a search for a chimera. How then can genuine controversy proceed? It does so characteristically in two stages.
The first is that in which each characterizes the contentions of its rival in its own terms, making explicit the grounds for rejecting what is incompatible with its own central theses, although sometimes allowing that from its own point of view and in the light of its own standards of judgement its rival has something to teach it on marginal and subordinate questions. A second stage is reached if and when the protagonists of each tradition, having considered in what ways their own tradition has by its own standards of achievement in enquiry found it difficult to develop its enquiries beyond a certain point, or has produced in some area insoluble antinomies, ask whether the alternative and rival tradition may not be able to provide resources to characterize and to explain the failings and defects of their own tradition more adequately than they, using the resources of that tradition, have been able to do. 33 Maclntyre went on to claim that, as a necessary assumption to this analysis, Every such tradition, to some significant degree, stands or falls as a mode of enquiry and has within itself at each stage a more or less well-defined problematic, that set of issues, difficulties, and problems which have emerged from its previous achievements in enquiry. Characteristically, therefore, such traditions possess measures to evaluate their own progress or lack of it, even if Arran E. Gare such measures necessarily are framed in terms of and presuppose the truth of those central theses to which the tradition gives its allegiance. 34 The outcome of this more testing trial of the approach to reconciling traditions led Maclntyre to add further guidelines. To begin with, he argued that insofar as two incompatible and incommensurable bodies of theory and practice are able to provide an accurate representation of each other, these representations will be of the other as a historically developing body of theory and practice, succeeding or failing at each stage, each in the light of its own standards, in respect of the difficulties or problems internal to it. Furthermore, the only way to approach a point at which our own standpoint could be vindicated against some rival is to understand our own standpoint in a way that renders it-from our own point of view-as problematic as possible, to appreciate it as a historically developing body of theory and practice, succeeding, and also failing, at each stage of its development. To see it in this way is to see its vulnerability to defeat by its rival as possible. It is necessary to take with full seriousness the possibility that we may in the end, as rational beings, have to abandon our point of view. But, in conclusion, Maclntyre also Philosophy East & West points out that since there is no independent, neutral standpoint to begin with, the approach to the Confucian tradition will necessarily be from within the Western tradition.
Maclntyre argued that Aquinas had been successful in mediating be
It should be evident from these studies that Maclntyre's concept of tradition has much in common with Foucault To begin with, when Needham began his work he was a leading scientist of Western civilization, holding a chair in biochemistry at Cambridge University. He embarked on his study of China because his research, attempting to develop a new approach to biology-mathematicophysico-chemical morphology-in accordance with the most recent advances in physics and philosophy, was blocked by the University.36 He also had a deep understanding of the whole history of Western science, philosophy, and civilization, of its achievements and limitations. Needham was therefore prepared to accept the possibility that the tradition or traditions he was studying might be superior at least in some respects to the tradition from which he was engaging in this study.
What Needham presented was a history of Chinese traditions of thought, evaluated in the first instance according to their successes and failures by their own criteria. In presenting these traditions, Needham also showed how they responded to each other in a way that accords with Maclntyre's analyses. Most importantly, the twelfth-century Neo-Arran E. Gare Arran E. Gare
